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Executive Summary 
T 
 
his Report analyses the current 
situation in the Euro area 
economy and discusses a number 
of policy issues concerned with the 
effects of fiscal policy and the 
convergence process in labour markets 
after the adoption of the common 
currency. We also look at the dating of 
business cycle turning points, and 
consider the consequences for the Euro 
area of the US current account and 
examine the extent to which it is 
structural and unsustainable. We also 
provide forecasts for key 
macroeconomic variables for 2002 and 
2003 and discuss the nature of the 
current economic downturn and the 
light it throws on the conduct of 
economic policy in a monetary union. 
The recovery from the world-wide 
slowdown during 2001 has proved 
slightly more sluggish than we expected 
in the Spring, and we now expect that 
GDP in the Euro area will grow by only 
0.9 % in 2002 compared to 2001. In the 
Spring Report we believed that the Euro 
area would grow by 1.2%. However, 
our forecast for GDP growth in 2003 
remains unchanged at 2.2%. 
Unemployment in the Euro area will 
continue to rise into 2003 to 8.6%. 
The turning point that we identified in 
our Spring Report has now been passed 
and the grounds have been laid for a 
steady, but slow upswing in economic 
activity in the Euro area. The trough of 
the economic slowdown in the 
aftermath of the IT bubble has now 
been reached and GDP growth in the 
first and second quarters of 2002 was 
encouraging. There has not been as 
sharp a rise in unemployment as in 
previous downturns as employers 
anticipating a shallow slowdown, have 
hoarded labour. However, the absence 
of a quick economic recovery means 
that unemployment will continue to rise 
into 2003.  
Events in the US and Europe have 
confounded the pessimists. Although 
the NBER in the US marked March 
2001 as the date on which the US went 
into recession, the slowdown has been 
very shallow. On a quarter by quarter 
basis GDP fell slightly in the first, 
second and third quarters of 2001, but 
resumed growing thereafter, albeit 
somewhat erratically. In the Euro area, 
GDP fell for one quarter only in 
2001(q4). 
Nevertheless, the reasonably benign 
picture for the Euro area as a whole 
masks big differences in economic 
performance between member 
countries, which is relevant because this 
is the first economic downturn during 
which monetary policy has been 
completely centralised at the ECB. The 
downturn has been felt much more 
keenly by Finland, Austria, Germany 
and Belgium, partly because these 
countries started in 2000 from a much 
weaker position. Other countries, such 
as Spain, Portugal and Greece, by 
contrast have managed to sustain a 
reasonable (though lower growth rate) 
throughout the downturn. 
The worst performing economy is 
Finland with 1st quarter GDP in 2002 
1.9% lower than the first quarter of 
2001, much of this coming from very 
weak export performance. Finland’s 
high-tech industries are particularly 
vulnerable to the world wide IT 
slowdown. Nevertheless, the downturn 
in Finland has not been as deep as the 
recession of the early 1990s, and 
recently there has been a sharp rise in 
consumer and business confidence and 
exports are rising again. There are also 
faint signs of recovery in the second 
quarter of 2002 in Germany, Italy and 
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Belgium, with a particularly sharp 
improvement in France. 
There is a limit to how much monetary 
policy can insulate a small economy 
from a major contraction in export 
markets, even if monetary policy were 
not centralised at the ECB. Generally, 
those economies that have performed 
worst in the current downturn have been 
those with the greatest exposure to 
exports to markets outside of the Euro 
area. In these circumstances there is 
little that can be done, especially if 
fiscal policy under the strictures of the 
Stability and Growth Pact is more 
skewed towards medium term balance 
than short run output stabilisation. 
While output continues to recover 
slowly, the outlook for the inflation rate 
in the harmonised index of consumer 
prices remains stubbornly high. The 
ECB is mandated by the Maastricht 
Treaty to maintain price stability. So the 
ECB does not have    strict goal 
independence but is at liberty to decide 
what price stability actually means. 
Price stability has been defined by the 
Governing Council of the ECB as 
annual price increases of less than 2 %.  
But it has also been made clear that the 
objective of price stability should be 
pursued over the medium term. On this 
interpretation our forecasts of inflation 
of 2.1 % in 2003 is consistent with this 
approach. But it makes the 2% objective 
particularly vulnerable to, for example, 
a sharp rise in oil prices in the event of 
military action against Iraq. 
We now summarize the contents of the 
policy papers contained in the Report, 
starting with the issue of dating the 
Euro area business cycle. 
We need more information about Euro 
area business cycles as an input to the 
policymaking process. For example, 
separating out the cyclical component 
of fiscal policy from the underlying 
structural position is essential if under 
the Stability and Growth Pact the 
automatic stabilisers are to be allowed 
to operate while maintaining the 
medium term commitment to a budget 
position of close to balance or in 
surplus. Separating out structural, long 
term fiscal policies from cyclical 
variations requires a business cycle 
chronology. 
In the United States the NBER's dating 
committee has established a business 
chronology over a long period of time 
which is widely regarded as the 
authoritative dating of the US cycle. 
Economists who come up with a new 
technique for business cycle 
identification "prove" their technique by 
comparing their results with the NBER 
chronology. The NBER's committee 
comprises economists with expertise in 
various sectors of the economy and its 
approach is avowedly a multivariate 
one: they use information from a variety 
of sources in order to unambiguously 
date business cycle turning points. It 
would be good for Europe to establish a 
comparably authoritative chronology 
for its business cycle, perhaps through 
similar means to the NBER - perhaps 
through a different one. At risk of 
stating the obvious, it bears pointing out 
that the European situation is different 
in many ways from the one that faces 
analysts of the American cyclical 
experience. Not least, because of the 
short history of the Euro area economy, 
country experts might be needed more 
than sectorial experts. Historical 
analysis would be complicated by 
national differences, but all the more 
necessary for this reason. A complaint 
that is often made against the NBER 
procedure is that it can take a long 
while, in real time, to establish a turning 
point, partly for reasons to do with data 
revisions and availability; some of those 
problems are more acute in the 
European setting. It could be argued 
that with techniques at hand today 
nothing more is really needed than 
reliable GDP estimates, with the benefit 
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of being robust to revision, to provide 
reliable dating of the cycle. It would 
help also if there were a measure of 
GDP at the monthly frequency for the 
Euro area. In Part II of this Report we 
describe and apply some of the methods 
that are available for creating a business 
cycle chronology for the Euro area. The 
finding that most methods generate a 
very similar chronology, and that this 
chronology is rather common across 
Euro area countries, are encouraging. 
The pooling of monetary policy in the 
Euro area has reawakened interest in 
fiscal policy and in the role that it could 
play in stimulating economic activity 
during a cyclical downturn. In the 
aftermath of September 11th the US not 
only loosened monetary policy but there 
was a fiscal relaxation through tax cuts 
and an increase in military expenditure. 
Here, in Part III we look, empirically, at 
the effect of fiscal policy in the four 
largest economies in the Euro area and 
separate out the systematic from the 
non-systematic parts of fiscal policy. 
The systematic part of fiscal policy in 
the form of plans for government 
expenditure and taxes, and the 
implications that this has for future 
taxation should have largely been 
internalised into saving and investment 
decisions. The systematic component 
will also contain the automatic 
stabilisers, or those parts of receipts and 
expenditures that vary with the business 
cycle. The non-systematic or 
unanticipated part of fiscal policy is that 
which has more relevance to short term 
fluctuations and to the discretionary use 
of fiscal policy at the level of individual 
countries when monetary policy is 
centralised in the ECB.  We provide a 
set of stylized facts on the effects of 
non-systematic fiscal policy in the four 
largest countries of the Euro area. The 
stylized facts are then used to shed light 
on the fiscal policy coordination debate, 
on the effectiveness of fiscal policy in 
stabilizing economic activity, and on 
the interaction of fiscal and monetary 
policy. 
We find that there are relevant 
differences in the effects of non-
systematic fiscal policy across 
countries, and substantial uncertainty 
about the size of these effects, which 
casts doubts on the possibility of a fiscal 
coordination, or at least complicates its 
implementation. The presence of 
spillovers across countries, another 
justification for a coordinated fiscal 
policy, is also uncertain, and their size 
turns out to be small.  
Moreover, unanticipated changes in 
government expenditure are found to be 
largely ineffective in changing output or 
reducing its volatility, possibly with the 
exception of government investment, 
and, since they are not accompanied by 
tax increases that balance the budget, 
they can require deficit financing. There 
are minor differences between more 
discretionary policies, such as 
government consumption, and 
automatic stabilizers, such as social 
benefits. Tax shocks also appear to have 
minor effects on output, and tax cuts 
could also require deficit financing 
because of the sluggish reaction of 
expenditures. These findings suggest 
focusing more on an accurate 
specification and implementation of the 
systematic part of fiscal policy rather 
than trying to stabilize the economy 
with fiscal shocks. 
The single market programme has 
helped to liberalise markets and to 
reduce non-tariff barriers to trade 
between the nation states of the 
European Union. However, much of 
this reform process has been confined to 
product and capital markets. While this 
matters a lot for the economic benefits 
that flow from specialisation, greater 
consumer choice and lower prices, the 
reform of labour markets has been much 
more timid. Yet the proper functioning 
of labour markets is a crucial part of the 
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move towards a better functioning 
currency area. Labour mobility and 
flexible wages play an important role in 
adjusting to non-symmetric economic 
shocks when individual nations do not 
have independent control over monetary 
policy, and fiscal policy is constrained. 
In Part IV of this Report we consider a 
number of issues that arise in the labour 
market with a common currency. There 
are already in place mechanisms for the 
regular monitoring of product and 
capital markets through the so-called 
Cardiff Process. However, there is not 
an equivalent process for labour 
markets. The Amsterdam Treaty 
commits the European Union to a high 
level of employment as an explicit 
objective and this was reiterated in 
Lisbon. But it is not clear how this 
translates into labour market 
performance and the role that the labour 
market will play in helping the process 
of economic and monetary 
convergence. The convergence of unit 
labour costs and productivity across the 
countries in the Euro area is studied in 
Part IV of this Report. It is found that 
while there has been convergence in the 
growth of nominal wages across the 
Euro area as inflation in prices and 
wages has converged in the movement 
towards a single currency, convergence 
in the levels of productivity has been 
absent. The danger is that with the 
transparency that a single currency 
brings, there will be increased 
convergence of nominal wages without 
improvements in productivity that 
ultimately determine standards of 
living. 
Part V deals with an external 
development particularly important for 
the Euro area. In 2001 the US current 
account deficit reached 4.1% of GDP. 
The worry is that if the deficit does not 
move back closer to balance or keeps 
widening, U.S. external liabilities would 
represent a growing share of world 
portfolios.  At some point investors 
could become unwilling to hold dollars. 
The ensuing large adjustment in the 
current account and fall in the external 
value of the dollar could lead to 
substantial dislocations in the world 
economy and disruptions in U.S. and 
world financial markets. 
The central issue is what is a sustainable 
current account deficit for an economy 
such as the US whose currency is very 
widely used for trading purposes. In 
Part V we examine two approaches. In 
the first, an intertemporal approach to 
the balance of payments emphasises 
both the importance of domestic saving 
and investment decisions and the role of 
international portfolio decisions by both 
domestic residents and foreigners. The 
question is what deficit is consistent 
with a number of reasonable 
assumptions about US growth, changes 
in the real exchange rate, import 
penetration and desired portfolio 
holdings. Calculations suggest that a 
deficit of 3.5% of GDP is sustainable.  
The second approach is more 
quantitative, and decomposes the deficit 
into its cyclical and structural 
components. The results suggest that 
there is a distinctive cyclical component 
to the deficit. The current account 
shows small surpluses during the 
recessions of the early 1980s and 1990s 
and large deficits during the peaks of 
the mid-1980s and late 1990s. By 
contrast, the structural deficit is that 
path for the deficit consistent with the 
average (1980 – 2001) real exchange 
rate and US growth relative to the rest 
of the world. On this interpretation the 
difference between the actual deficit 
and the structural deficit can be 
attributed to the faster rate of growth of 
the US economy relative to the rest of 
the world.  
A real business cycle interpretation of 
this finding is that the technological 
shock coming from electronics and IT 
has been taken up much more quickly 
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during the 1990s by the US compared to 
elsewhere. Since domestic savings are 
unlikely to rise, the investment boom 
domestically has to imply a current 
account deficit. The question is what the 
medium term outlook will be. In the 
standard growth model a technological 
shock will only affect growth over the 
medium term as the capital stock rises. 
However, once the technology has been 
fully taken up elsewhere the 
(comparatively) high growth rate in the 
US will recede and the current account 
will move back towards a lower 
equilibrium. When this will happen 
depends upon how quickly the rest of 
the world adopts the productivity 
enhancing technologies coming from IT 
as fully as the US. 
 
Highlights for the Euro area Economy 
 
• The Euro area will grow by 0.9% in 2002 and 2.2% in 2003. 
• Inflation in the harmonised consumer price index is forecast to average 2.3 % in 
2002 and to decline slightly in 2003 to 2.1%. 
• Exports will rise by 1.7% in 2002 and on the back of a strong recovery in world 
trade by 8.7% in 2003. 
• Investment remains very weak, falling by 1.7% in 2002 and rising by only 2.3% in 
2003. 
• Private consumption, after growing by only 1.8% in 2001, rises by only 0.5% in 
2002 and 1.4% in 2003. 
• The euro is forecast to be 2.0 % higher during 2002 and slightly lower by 0.6 %% in 
2003. 
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Table I.1: Economic Outlook for the Euro area 
 1999 2000 2001 2002: 2nd half 2002: annual 2003: annual 
    Point Forecast
Interval 
Forecast
Point 
Forecast
Interval 
Forecast 
Point 
Forecast 
Interval 
Forecast
1.1 0.7 1.7 
GDP 2.8 3.5 1.5 1.4 
1.8 
0.9 
1.1 
2.2 
2.7 
2.0 2.1 1.3 
Potential Output 2.6 3.2 2.4 2.3 
2.5 
2.4 
2.8 
1.9 
2.5 
-0.1 0.1 0.6 
Private Consumption 3.5 2.5 1.8 0.5 
1.1 
0.5 
0.8 
1.4 
2.2 
1.3 1.6 0.9 Government 
Consumption 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.6 1.8 
1.7 
1.8 
1.2 
1.6 
-2.3 -2.6 0.0 
Fixed Capital Formation 5.9 4.8 -0.6 -0.7 
1.0 
-1.7 
-0.9 
2.3 
4.5 
-0.2 -0.2 0.0 
Inventories / GDP 0.2 0.2 -0.2 0.0 
0.2 
-0.1 
0.0 
0.3 
0.5 
3.6 1.0 6.8 
Exports 5.3 12.4 2.5 4.8 
6.1 
1.7 
2.3 
8.7 
10.5 
1.8 -0.8 6.3 
Imports 7.4 11.1 1.1 3.5 
5.3 
0.1 
0.9 
8.6 
10.8 
8.3 8.2 8.4 
Unemployment Rate 9.5 8.5 8.0 8.4 
8.4 
8.3 
8.3 
8.6 
8.9 
8.1 8.2 8.0 
NAIRU 9.7 9.1 8.5 8.2 
8.3 
8.2 
8.3 
8.3 
8.5 
7.6 3.9 8.6 
World Trade 6.3 12.1 0.5 8.9 
10.2 
4.6 
5.2 
10.2 
11.8 
-0.3 0.2 -5.6 Euro Nominal Effective 
Exchange Rate -5.8 -11.1 1.8 3.2 6.4 
2.0 
3.6 
-0.6 
4.3 
0.9 1.6 -5.3 Euro Real Effective 
Exchange Rate -5.6 -10.2 2.8 4.3 7.5 
3.3 
4.9 
-0.3 
4.5 
3.0 3.2 3.2 
Short Term Interest Rate 3.0 4.4 4.3 3.4 
3.7 
3.4 
3.6 
3.7 
4.4 
4.9 5.0 4.6 
Long Term Interest Rate 4.7 5.4 5.0 5.2 
5.6 
5.2 
5.4 
5.2 
5.8 
3.1 3.4 2.1 
Labour Cost Index 2.3 3.2 3.3 3.4 
3.7 
3.6 
3.8 
2.6 
3.1 
-0.3 0.2 1.6 
Labour Productivity 1.0 1.1 0.5 0.4 
1.0 
0.4 
0.6 
2.3 
2.9 
1.9 2.1 1.3 
HICP 1.1 2.4 2.5 2.3 
2.7 
2.3 
2.5 
2.1 
2.9 
1.9 2.2 1.5 Deflator Private 
Consumption 1.7 2.1 2.4 2.3 2.7 
2.4 
2.6 
1.9 
2.4 
1.5 1.9 1.2 
GDP Deflator 1.8 1.3 2.3 2.0 
2.4 
2.1 
2.4 
1.7 
2.3 
Percentage change in the average level compared with the same period a year earlier, except for 
unemployment rate, NAIRU and interest rates that are expressed in levels. Point forecasts and 80% 
confidence bounds are taken from EFN forecasting models and based on 2000 stochastic simulations. 
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PART I Euro area conjunctural analysis
 
Current economic situation – 
G 
Overview 
DP in the Euro area grew by 
1.4% during 2001. Over the 
course of the year, growth rates 
declined, and in the fourth quarter, 
seasonally adjusted GDP even dropped 
by 0.3%, compared to the previous 
quarter. But compared to previous 
economic downturns and the magnitude 
of the fall in world equity markets, the 
unwinding of the IT boom and the sharp 
shock to consumer and business 
sentiment after September 11th 2001, 
the downturn has been comparatively 
mild and shallow. The loosening of 
monetary policy during 2001 by the 
ECB and the US Fed appears to have 
done the trick. Nevertheless, there are 
still a number of major imbalances and 
continuing uncertainty and volatility in 
equity markets. Political and military 
events in the Middle East have 
increased uncertainty about oil prices, 
and investment in the private sector 
remains weak. There is little prospect of 
sharp improvement in economic 
performance in the next eighteen 
months. 
In the first half of 2002 a slow 
economic recovery has begun in the 
Euro area. On a quarter by quarter basis, 
seasonally adjusted GDP grew by 0.4% 
in the first quarter and by 0.3% in the 
second. While in the first quarter Euro 
area growth had been driven by net 
exports, in the second quarter household 
consumption has also started to recover. 
The latter fell by 0.2% in the first 
quarter, followed by an increase of 
0.4%. A significant unexpected increase 
of inflation in January exerted a 
negative influence on real disposable 
income. The rise in inflation was mainly 
caused by high food prices due to 
unfavourable weather conditions in 
southern Europe. In addition, 
households faced a considerable plunge 
of equity wealth due to the stock market 
decline. Furthermore, unfavourable 
employment expectations caused 
households to restrain from spending. 
This is reflected in the retail confidence 
indicator which declined in January and 
February and has remained almost 
unchanged since then. With 0.8% 
negative rate in the second quarter, 
investment dropped for the sixth 
consecutive quarter. Capacity utilization 
in the manufacturing sector continued to 
decline in the first half 2002. 
Uncertainty about future profit 
prospects is still prevalent. This is 
reflected in the unclear trend in the 
industrial confidence indicators 
published by the EU commission. After 
stagnating in April, industrial 
confidence improved slightly in May, 
but fell again in June and stagnated in 
July. In the second quarter, exports 
including intra-area trade increased by 
2%, after a slight increase between 
January and March. In 2001, exports 
had dropped in each quarter. Imports 
continued to decline in the first quarter 
of 2002, but increased by 1.7% in the 
second. Net exports contributed 0.3 
percentage points to overall GDP 
growth in the first quarter and 0.1 
percentage points in the second. The 
resurgence of export growth was driven 
by the ongoing recovery of the world 
economy, notably in the US, in the first 
quarter. Euro area imports followed the 
path of weak domestic demand. 
The slight recovery of the Euro area 
economy in the first half of this year is 
also prevalent in industrial production. 
After declining in each quarter of 2001, 
seasonally adjusted industrial 
production grew by 0.9% in the first 
quarter and by 0.25% in the second. 
After an increase from January to 
March, production of intermediate 
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goods declined again in April and May, 
before recovering again in June. The 
declining trend in the production of 
capital goods that started in June 2001 
could be reversed in January. This can 
be taken as an evidence for a 
stabilisation of investment activity. 
However, the recovery does not seem to 
be very robust at the current stage 
which can be seen from the interruption 
of the positive development in May. 
The inflation rates during the first seven 
months of 2002 have been above the 
forecasted path estimated in the Spring 
2002 EFN Report. This has been mainly 
due to a one-off upward movement in 
prices concentrated basically in the 
month of January and in the prices of 
food, energy and services, associated in 
part with the introduction of euro notes 
and coins. As a consequence, the rate of 
core inflation, which excludes prices of 
non-processed food and energy, in 
August 2002 has been 2.5%. A study of 
the forecast errors in the different 
components of the HICP and a 
corresponding intervention analysis 
suggests that rounding effects related to 
the introduction of the euro could have 
pushed up the prices of food and 
services, with a total effect on the core 
inflation rate of around three tenths of a 
percentage point. Therefore, it can be 
said that euro rounding effects are 
responsible for the slightly higher-than-
expected level of core inflation 
experienced in these months of 2002. 
Total inflation has also been affected by 
upward movements in energy prices. 
In conclusion, as forecasted in the 
Spring Report, inflation in the Euro area 
has been decreasing through 2002 but 
from a higher-than-expected inflation 
rate registered in January 2002 due to 
euro rounding effects, seasonal price 
effects and upward movements in crude 
oil prices. 
The outlook for 2002 and 2003 
Table I.1 provides an overview of the 
expected developments of the 
macroeconomic indicators in 2002 and 
2003. Point forecasts are shown 
together with 80% confidence bands. 
The point forecast for Euro area GDP 
growth is 0.9% for 2002 and 2.2% for 
2003. Given the confidence bands, with 
a probability of 80% the actual GDP 
growth rate will be in the range of 0.7% 
to 1.1% in 2002. Next year the expected 
GDP growth rate will fall into the range 
1.7% to 2.7%. In 2002, economic 
activity will remain sluggish in the Euro 
area. Therefore, imports will stagnate, 
while exports will grow moderately. 
Thus, this year the main contribution to 
GDP growth will stem from net exports. 
In 2003 when the recovery of the world 
economy stimulates domestic activity of 
the Euro area, domestic demand will be 
the driving force of GDP growth. 
Potential output will grow by 2.4% in 
2002 and by 1.9% in 2003. The decline 
in the growth rate can be explained by 
the negative performance of investment. 
As in 2002, capital formation will 
decrease for the third consecutive year, 
capital accumulation will also be 
sluggish which has adverse effects on 
potential GDP. Due to the low growth 
rates of both actual and potential GDP, 
the output gap will not be closed until 
the end of 2003. Therefore, from this 
side there will be no inflationary 
pressure. The labour market reacts to 
the development of production with a 
time lag. Therefore, and due to weak 
GDP growth over the forecasting 
horizon, unemployment will continue to 
rise until the end of 2003 when it 
reaches 8.6%. In addition, high wage 
growth in the past exerts a negative 
influence on employment creation with 
a time lag. In 2003, wages will increase 
at a lower rate as actual unemployment 
increases whereas the NAIRU remains 
more or less stable. 
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After low economic growth last year, 
the recovery of the world economy that 
started at the beginning of 2002 will 
remain sluggish in the remaining course 
of this year. It will gain momentum next 
year. Due to a negative carry over effect 
and a weak first half of the year, the 
average annual growth rate of world 
trade will only reach 4.6% in 2002. In 
2003, world trade will increase by 
9.6%. 
From a high of 1.14 euro to the dollars 
in April of 2002, the exchange rate in 
the last three months has stabilised just 
above one. There are always 
particularly large margins of error 
associated with forecasting exchange 
rates, but we expect that it will remain 
broadly where it is to the end of 2002 
and through 2003. The real euro 
exchange rate should also remain 
constant in 2003 and appreciate by 
about 3% in 2002. 
 
Table I.2: Contribution to change in GDP 
  2001 2002 2003 
Domestic Demand 0.9 0.3 1.9 
   Private Consumption 1.0 0.3 0.8 
   Government Consumption 0.4 0.3 0.2 
   Fixed Capital Formation -0.1 -0.4 0.5 
   Change in Inventories -0.4 0.1 0.4 
Net Exports 0.6 0.6 0.3 
   Exports 1.0 0.6 3.3 
   Imports -0.4 -0.0 -3.0 
GDP 1.5 0.9 2.2 
Percentage points 
 
The year-on-year inflation rate is 
expected to increase from 1.9%, the 
value in July, to 2.5% in December 
2002 and then oscillate around a 2% 
mean value in 2003. A similar pattern is 
expected for the annual percentage 
change in prices, with values of 2.3% 
for 2002 and 2.1% for 2003 (see Tables 
I.1 and I.3). The higher inflation rates 
forecasted for the last part of 2002 are 
mainly due to the expected behaviour of 
energy prices which, during this part of 
2001, showed a negative mean value of 
0.94%. Core inflation is expected to be 
quite stable around 2.5% in the 
remaining months of 2002 and to drop 
to 2.3% in 2003, because rounding 
effects will no longer be present. Total 
inflation in 2003 will also benefit from 
an expected zero inflation rate in energy 
consumer prices. 
The above results also imply that the 
inflation target will not be fulfilled in 
the last four months of 2002 and that 
the probability of reaching it at the 
average annual rate for 2003 is just 
50%. The important point in this respect 
is that core inflation has not been below 
2% since March 2001. The ECB is 
enjoined by the Maastricht Treaty to use 
the harmonised index of consumer 
prices in its pursuit of price stability. So 
the question is why they should look 
also at something like core inflation. 
One answer is that the price stability 
requirement is rightly conceived of as a 
medium term target and there are going 
to be a number of perturbations to 
inflation in the short run that ought not 
invite adjustments in monetary policy. 
Hence, tracking core inflation, which 
excludes volatile items such as food, 
tobacco and energy, may provide a 
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better guide to medium term 
developments in inflation. 
Another possibly worrying feature of 
inflation in the Euro area is that 
consumer prices of non-energy 
industrial goods are expected to grow at 
year-on-year rates around 1.5% in 2002 
and 1.2% for 2003, while the 
corresponding rates for the US are 
minus 1.4% for 2002 and minus 0.6% 
for 2003. The different degree to which 
the US is incorporating technological 
innovations could be the reason for this 
important differential. Policy measures 
which introduce more competitiveness 
into European markets could induce 
firms to invest more in new 
technologies. 
 
Table I.3: Inflation Rates in the EMU and in the US 
 Forecasts 
 2001 2002 2003 
TOTAL INFLATION     
Euro area (100%). 2.5 2.3 2.1 
US (81.5%). 2.6 1.0 2.1 
CORE INFLATION      
Services and Non-energy industrial goods 
excluding  food and tobacco.      
Euro area (70.97%). 1.9 2.5 2.3 
US (56.4%). 2.1 1.6 1.9 
DIFFERENT COMPONENTS OF CORE 
INFLATION       
(1)  Services.      
Euro area (38.90%). 2.5 3.2 3.2 
US (27.4%). 3.6 3.7 3.5 
(2) Non-energy industrial goods excluding 
food and tobacco.      
Euro area (32.07%). 1.1 1.5 1.2 
US (29.0%). -0.2 -1.4 -0.6 
Percentage change in the average level compared with the same period a year earlier. In brackets we show 
the percentage coverage of each index compared to the HICP. The US index covers 81.4% of the items 
included in the HICP. The excluded item is the imputed rent on privately owned property.  
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T 
P
he business cycle is commonly 
understood to mean broadly-
based co-movements of 
economic variables in a sequentially 
oscillatory manner. The term 'cycle' is a 
misnomer to the extent to which it 
suggests a regular periodicity, though 
the term has been in use for more than a 
century (trade cycles were a 
preoccupation of many economists of 
the 19th century).  One of the features of 
real world business cycles is that their 
length and depth (duration and 
amplitude) seems to vary. Indeed one of 
the current preoccupations of US 
business cycle experts is to explain the 
apparent recent lengthening of the cycle 
there. 
ART II: Dating the Euro area business cycle
Two definitions of the cycle are often 
used - the so-called classical cycle and 
the growth or deviation cycle. The 
difference between the two is 
conceptually simple. In the case of the 
deviation cycle, turning points are 
defined with respect to deviations of the 
rate of growth of GDP from an 
appropriately defined trend rate of 
growth. There is a large technical 
literature which is concerned with the 
best method of extracting a trend from 
the data and it turns out that the exact 
method adopted may carry quite 
important implications for the 
subsequent dating of the turning points. 
The classical cycle, by contrast, selects 
its turning points on the basis of an 
absolute decline (or rise) in the value of 
GDP. 
In early post-war decades, especially in 
Western Europe, growth was relatively 
persistent and absolute declines in 
output were comparatively rare; the 
growth cycle then seemed to be of more 
analytical value especially as inflexions 
in the rate of growth of output could 
reasonably be related to fluctuations in 
the levels of employment and 
unemployment. In more recent decades, 
however, there have been a number of 
instances of absolute declines in output, 
and popular description at any rate has 
focused more on the classical cycle (for 
example there is a widespread 
impression that a recession defines itself 
as two consecutive quarters of absolute 
decline). In addition, the concern 
mentioned above that de-trending 
methods can affect the information 
content of the series in unwonted ways, 
has reinforced the case for examining 
the classical cycle. In this paper we 
perform our dating exercise on both 
concepts of the cycle. 
We need more information about Euro 
area business cycles as an input to the 
policymaking process. For example, 
separating out the cyclical component 
of fiscal policy from the underlying 
structural position is essential if under 
the Stability and Growth Pact the 
automatic stabilisers are to be allowed 
to operate while maintaining the 
medium term commitment to a budget 
position of close to balance or in 
surplus. Separating out structural, long 
term fiscal policies from cyclical 
variations requires a business cycle 
chronology. 
Moreover, if there are business cycle 
downturns, then from the point of view 
of an optimal currency area, the more 
synchronized they are between the 
nation states of the Euro area, the easier 
it will be set monetary policy at the 
aggregate level. In the longer term 
economic integration is likely to alter 
the business cycles of individual 
countries, but in the short term we need 
to monitor the way in which business 
cycles behave in individual countries to 
ensure that over time there is as great a 
degree of synchronisation as is 
consistent with the efficient working of 
product and labour markets. 
 5
In the United States the NBER's dating 
committee has established a business 
chronology over a long period of time 
which is widely regarded as the 
authoritative dating of the US cycle. 
Economists who come up with a new 
technique for business cycle 
identification "prove" their technique by 
comparing their results with the NBER 
chronology. The NBER's committee 
comprises economists with expertise in 
various sectors of the economy and its 
approach is avowedly a multivariate 
one: they use information from a variety 
of sources in order to unambiguously 
date business cycle turning points. Here 
we apply some techniques to the Euro 
area that are easier to use and can be 
more timely. It would be good for 
Europe to establish a comparably 
authoritative chronology for its business 
cycle, perhaps through similar means to 
the NBER - perhaps through a different 
one. At risk of stating the obvious, it 
bears pointing out that the European 
situation is different in many ways from 
the one that faces analysts of the 
American cyclical experience. Not least, 
because of the short history of the Euro 
area economy, country experts might be 
needed more than sectorial experts. 
Historical analysis would be 
complicated by national differences, but 
all the more necessary for this reason. A 
complaint that is often made against the 
NBER procedure is that it can take a 
long while, in real time, to establish a 
turning point, partly for reasons to do 
with data revisions and availability; 
some of those problems are more acute 
in the European setting. Then also, it 
might be argued that with techniques at 
hand today nothing more is really 
needed than reliable GDP estimates, 
with the benefit of being robust to 
revision, to provide reliable dating of 
the cycle. To provide more accurate 
dating, better monthly data are certainly 
needed. 
 
The aggregate cycle 
This section analyses aggregate time 
series data available for the Euro area 
both from the perspective of the 
classical and deviation cycle 
approaches. The emphasis is on Euro 
area GDP, measured at constant prices. 
The Classical business cycle  
Our classical business cycle chronology 
is presented compactly in Figure II.1. 
Two alternative measures of Euro area 
GDP are employed: the ECB series and 
the series produced by Beyer, Hendry 
and Doornik. The former has a longer 
sample period (1970-2001) than the 
latter (1980-2001) and reveals one more 
cycle. Otherwise, the three cycles 
identified in the shorter data period 
overlap almost exactly, the only 
difference being in the location of the 
last trough which is anticipated by one 
quarter if one takes the BDH measure, 
and the three decades from 1970 
comprise four cycles altogether. It 
should also be noticed that the two 
quarters’ recession in 1982 is a minor 
event and would be censored if the 
dating algorithm was tailored to impose 
minimum requirements on the depth of 
recessions and expansions; we will 
return to this issue shortly. 
Table II.1 displays some descriptive 
statistics. There is a notable asymmetry 
between the average length of 
expansions and recessions, the former 
much longer (28 quarters) than the latter 
(3 quarters), which is to be expected of 
classical cycles in a growing economy. 
The probabilities of being in one or 
other phase reflect the relative values of 
these phase lengths over the sample 
period. The amplitudes of the expansion 
periods are also much bigger than those 
of the recession periods. "Steepness", 
following the suggestion of Harding and 
Pagan (2001) is measured as the 
quotient of the amplitude and the 
duration of the phase. Expansions last 
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longer, and are steeper than recessions, 
which are quite brief and yet more 
gently sloped. The shape of the euro 
business cycle is much as we would 
expect from previous analysis of 
country based business cycles. 
 Deviation Cycles 
An alternative business cycle definition 
refers to the recurrent, though not 
strictly periodic, deviations around the 
long term path of the series. The 
deviation or growth cycle typically 
involves trying to capture what is 
essentially an unobserved component 
and various methods have been 
proposed to extract it. 
Figure II.2 presents several measures of 
the deviation cycle in the Euro area 
GDP, with the associated turning points. 
The first measure (displayed in the 
upper left panel) is derived using the 
Baxter and King filter, which is 
available for the central part of the 
sample excluding the first and last 12 
quarters:  this loss of data is a major 
drawback of the Baxter-King filter. The 
second, displayed on the upper right 
panel, is the Hodrick-Prescott cycle. By 
the judicious choice of HP dampening 
parameter it is possible to mimic very 
closely the results of the Baxter-King 
filter, yet avoiding the penalty of losing 
data. As can be seen for the period 
covered in common by the two 
methods, the band pass filter closely 
replicates the cycle estimates produced 
by the Baxter-King filter, albeit with 
some additional noise - without losing 
the estimates at the beginning and end 
of the sample. Finally, the bottom 
panels display measures of the output 
gap derived respectively from a 
bivariate model of GDP and CPI 
inflation and a multivariate model based 
on total factor productivity, labour force 
participation rates, the unemployment 
rate, capacity utilization and CPI 
inflation. This method contrasts with 
the statistical methods of separating out 
the cycle from the trend by using a 
production function. The notion of an 
output gap is in principle more useful 
than the deviation cycle, since it 
provides a measure of inflationary 
pressures.  
Figure II.2 shows a broad agreement in 
identifying turning points: the 74.1 and 
80.1 peaks are common to all four 
methods. The location of the start of the 
90s recession is more uncertain since 
there are two neighbouring peaks at the 
beginning of 1990 and 1992 which is a 
feature of the expenditure components 
and the GDP of individual countries. 
Also the beginning of the 80s expansion 
is scored differently by the different 
methods. This is likely due to minor 
differences in the timing of the cycle in 
the largest Euro area countries, (see 
next section). 
The right hand part of Table II.1 
presents some characteristics of the 
deviation cycles extracted by the HP 
quarterly band pass filter when no 
censoring rule on the amplitude of the 
fluctuations is invoked.  It can be seen 
that this results in a relatively large 
number of turning points which affects 
the statistics for duration and amplitude. 
A stylized fact, however, that is robust 
to the choice of censoring rules is that 
the average amplitude of recessions and 
expansions is about the same, as 
implied by the symmetry of the cyclical 
model or signal extraction filter. 
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Table II.1: BC dating of Euro area time series: summary statistics 
Classical BC dating Deviation BC dating
Number of cycles P-P 4 10
Number of cycles T-T 4 9
Average Expansion Prob. 0.9032 0.6290
Average Recession Prob. 0.0968 0.3710
Average Duration of Exp. 28 7.8
Average Duration of Rec. 3 5.1111
Average Amplitude of Exp. 0.2117 0.0159
Average Amplitude of Rec. -0.0143 -0.0168
Steepness of expansions 0.0076 0.0020
Steepness of recessions -0.0048 -0.0033  
 
Country-specific cycles 
Our focus so far has been on the Euro 
area aggregate. But there is also interest 
in the business cycles of individual 
countries. We focus on two data sets, 
the first relating to GDP at constant 
prices for five countries, Germany, 
France, Italy, UK and the US, starting 
from 1970 and available from various 
sources, among them the OECD’s Main 
Economic Indicators and the US Bureau 
of Economic Analysis. For Germany 
the series, made available by the IFO, 
has been seasonally adjusted, and 
corrected for working days and the level 
shift due to reunification, using the 
basic structural model with regression 
effects. The Euro area series is used for 
comparison. The second set is produced 
by Eurostat and provides a highly 
comparable set of statistics on real GDP 
based on the new system of national 
accounts (ESA95), for a larger set of 
countries but for a shorter time span, 
beginning in 1980 for most countries.  
Figure II.3 presents the turning points of 
the classical business cycle for the Euro 
area, Germany, France, Italy, UK and 
the US. A visual inspection of Figure 
II.3 suggests a large degree of 
synchronization and concordance 
among the Euro area country specific 
business cycles. 
One feature of the performance of the 
US economy in the 1990s has been the 
sustainability (until the downturn of 
2001) of the upswing from the recession 
of the early 1990s. This has been 
thought of particular note and some 
have pointed to it as evidence of a trend 
breaking jump in US productivity 
growth as a result of the rapid adoption 
of new technologies in 
telecommunications. However, we can 
also observe a similarly sustained 
cyclical upswing in the Euro area. 
Figure II.3 shows that in the Euro area 
after the downturn in 1992, the Euro 
area also experienced a sustained 
upswing until 2002. This development 
has been disguised by the varying 
performance of individual countries and 
their exposure to idiosyncratic shocks, 
for example reunification in Germany.  
However, it is also true that over the 
period from the first quarter of 1992 to 
the last quarter of 2001 GDP in the US 
grew by 36%, the Euro area by 19% and 
Japan by 9%. This more than anything 
points to the need for the full 
implementation of the structural 
reforms in product, labour and capital 
markets in order to allow the Euro area 
to match the growth rates of the US. 
Cyclical concordance 
A simple measure of cyclical 
concordance between two countries can 
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be based on the proportion of the time 
that they share the same phase 
(expansion, recession), but because of 
the bias towards expansion, this is not a 
very revealing measure. If we correct 
this measure for this bias and then 
divide the consequent mean-corrected 
index of concordance by its standard 
error, we can arrive at a standardized 
index of concordance. Table II.2 
displays the standardized index of 
concordance between the classical 
business cycles for the individual 
countries and the Euro area aggregate 
cycle. The UK cycle shows even less 
concordance with the Euro area cycle 
than the US.  
The standardized concordance indexes 
based on deviation cycles are reported 
in Table II.3. These results largely 
confirm the presumption of a high 
degree of synchronization within the 
Euro area. But now the UK is slightly 
more synchronized with the Euro area 
than the US. 
 
Table II.2: Classical BC: Standardised Concordance Index 
EA D UK F I US
EA - 7.15 2.48 6.29 6.35 3.40
D 7.15 - 1.93 5.41 5.43 4.43
UK 2.48 1.93 - 3.00 2.33 3.50
F 6.29 5.41 3.00 - 4.59 1.92
I 6.35 5.43 2.33 4.59 - 3.20
US 3.40 4.43 3.50 1.92 3.20 -  
 
Table II.3: Deviation Cycle: Standardised Concordance Index 
EA D UK F I US
EA - 4.83 3.42 4.71 5.77 2.75
D 4.83 - 2.95 2.66 3.48 2.53
UK 3.42 2.95 - 2.07 2.33 2.26
F 4.71 2.66 2.07 - 3.67 2.47
I 5.77 3.48 2.33 3.67 - 1.90
US 2.75 2.53 2.26 2.47 1.90 -  
 
Conclusions 
We have reported the results of 
technical exercises in the dating of the 
Euro area business cycle and the cycles 
of the main constituent economies. We 
distinguished between the classical and 
deviation (or growth) cycle, and used 
what we regard as best-practice 
techniques to identify these cycles, in 
every case concentrating upon a single, 
univariate summary of economic 
activity. We also examined the degree 
of synchronicity or coherence between 
the cycles. For the purpose of 
monitoring the integration of the Euro 
area, it is important to be able to track 
movements in the coherence of the 
cyclical experience of the Euro area. 
Timely evidence of a possible fall in the 
degree of coherence between parts of 
the Euro area may require changes in 
policy to prevent the fragmentation of 
economic activity and increases in 
inequality between different regions. 
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Figure II.1: Classical cycle turning points, expansions and recessions, in the Euro area quarterly real GDP (seasonally 
adjusted, logarithms); ECB series and Beyer, Doornik and Hendry (2000) estimates. 
 
Figure II.2: Turning points for four alternative measures of the Euro area deviation cycle. An asterisk (*) denotes a 
turning point that was censored according to amplitude considerations (see text for details). 
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Figure II.3: Classical cycle turning points for EA, Germany, France, Italy, UK and the US, based on HP(1.25) filtered 
quarterly real GDP. 
 
 
Figure II.4: Classical cycle turning points, for the Euro area countries based on quarterly real GDP (seasonally 
adjusted, logarithms); Eurostat series, 1980.1-2002.1. 
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Part III: The Role of non-systematic fiscal policy in the 
Euro area
T he increased centralisation of monetary policy across the world, into currency boards or 
through dollarisation, or by the pooling 
of monetary policy as in the Euro area, 
has reawakened interest in fiscal policy 
and in the role of fiscal policy in 
stimulating economic activity. Here we 
look, empirically, at the effect of fiscal 
policy in the four largest economies in 
the Euro area and separate out the 
systematic from the non-systematic 
parts of fiscal policy. The systematic 
part of fiscal policy in the form of plans 
for government expenditure and taxes, 
and the implications that this has for 
future taxation should have largely been 
internalised into saving and investment 
decisions. The non-systematic or 
unanticipated part of fiscal policy is that 
which has more relevance to short term 
fluctuations and to the use of fiscal 
policy at the level of individual 
countries when monetary policy is 
centralised in the ECB, within the 
confines of the Stability and Growth 
Programme.  This part provides a set of 
stylized facts on the effects of non-
systematic fiscal policy in the four 
largest countries of the Euro area. The 
stylized facts are then used to shed light 
on the fiscal policy coordination debate, 
on the effectiveness of fiscal policy in 
stabilizing economic activity, and on 
the interaction of fiscal and monetary 
policy. 
We find that there are big differences in 
the effects of non-systematic fiscal 
policy across countries, and substantial 
uncertainty about the size of these 
effects, which casts doubts on the 
possibility of a fiscal coordination, or at 
least complicates its implementation. 
The presence of spillovers across 
countries, another justification for a 
coordinated fiscal policy, is also 
uncertain, and their size turns out to be 
small.  
Moreover, unanticipated changes in 
government expenditure are found to be 
largely ineffective in changing output, 
possibly with the exception of 
government investment, and, since they 
are not accompanied by tax increases 
that balance the budget, they can require 
deficit financing. There are minor 
differences between more discretionary 
policies, such as government 
consumption, and automatic stabilizers, 
such as social benefits. Tax policies also 
appear to have minor effects on output, 
and tax cuts could also require deficit 
financing because of the sluggish 
reaction of expenditures. 
As far as the interaction with monetary 
policy is concerned, fiscal policy shocks 
appear to have an impact on interest 
rates, either directly or through the 
output gap and inflation, and the 
exclusion of fiscal variables can bias, in 
a few cases, the evaluation of the effects 
of monetary policy. On the other hand, 
the effects of monetary policy on 
disbursements and receipts seem to be 
minor. 
A few caveats are in order to interpret 
correctly our results. First, there is an 
implicit assumption that the fiscal shock 
exerts its effects when it is implemented 
rather than when it is announced. 
Second, we stress that we focus on non-
systematic fiscal policy, and that the 
effects of systematic policy could be 
rather different. Third, we focus on the 
effects of fiscal variables on key 
macroeconomic variables such as 
output growth and inflation, but there 
can be other welfare effects of fiscal 
policy, e.g. on income distribution or 
quality of life that are not captured. 
Finally, other studies have found 
substantially different effects after the 
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‘70s so we focus on the period 1981-
2001. The drawback is that the limited 
number of observations results in 
substantial uncertainty about the 
estimated effects. 
The effects of fiscal shocks 
In this section we evaluate the effects of 
a shock to government disbursements or 
receipts in Germany, France, Italy and 
Spain. In the first subsection we discuss 
the dynamic responses of the variables 
of interest to fiscal shocks. In the 
second subsection we conduct a 
counterfactual experiment. We 
dynamically simulate the model setting 
to zero the fiscal shocks, and compare 
actual and simulated behaviour in order 
to evaluate whether non-systematic 
fiscal policy had a stabilizing role. 
The dynamic response of the economy 
to fiscal shocks 
Firstly, the effects of government 
expenditure on the output gap are very 
limited, with the exception of Germany 
where the response is positive and 
significant. Second, inflation increases 
significantly in France, which also leads 
to an increase in the interest rate (an 
insignificant increase takes place also in 
Italy and Spain). The reaction of 
inflation in the other countries is instead 
limited and not statistically significant. 
Third, in all countries, the expenditure 
shock is very persistent and the reaction 
of taxes is delayed and not sufficient to 
balance the budget. Overall, these 
results cast serious doubts on the 
stabilization role of fiscal policy 
implemented through expenditure 
changes, the effects of which on output 
appear to be limited, while they could 
lead to an increase in inflation and 
require deficit financing. 
Let us now make three comments on the 
effects of a (positive) tax shock. First, 
the output gap decreases, as predicted 
by Keynesian theory, in Germany only. 
In the other countries the effects are 
very limited, but positive and 
significant in Italy, perhaps as a 
consequence of the improvement in the 
government deficit and more generally 
in fiscal solvency. An alternative 
explanation for the positive effects of a 
tax shock could be that, since it is 
actually a revenue shock, it can be due 
either to an increase in the tax rate or to 
an increase in the tax base, and the latter 
is positively correlated with the output 
gap. Yet, if this were the case, an 
increase in the output gap should be 
also associated with higher revenues, 
while this does not appear to be the 
case, as we will see below. 
Second, the consequences of the tax 
shock on inflation are in general 
limited, as well as those on the interest 
rate, though it significantly decreases in 
France and increases in Spain. The 
latter effect is explained by an 
associated increase in the price of raw 
materials, which appears to lead 
Spanish inflation. 
Third, in all countries, a tax shock is 
associated with only a limited increase 
in expenditures, so that overall the 
deficit is reduced. 
In summary, the effects of fiscal shocks 
are rather different across countries and 
surrounded by considerable uncertainty. 
Yet, a consistent pattern is that 
expenditure and tax shocks have limited 
stabilization effects, a result in line with 
Perotti (2002), but tax shocks can play a 
role in deficit reduction while 
expenditure shocks may require deficit 
financing. 
Assessing the in-sample effects of fiscal 
shocks 
To provide further evidence on the 
effects of non-systematic fiscal policy, 
we simulated the structural VAR 
models setting to zero the fiscal shocks 
and to their realized values all the other 
shocks. Thus, a comparison of the 
actual and simulated behaviour of the 
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macroeconomic variables provides an 
indication of the in-sample effects of 
non-systematic fiscal policy.  
The results are reported in the first two 
rows of each panel in Table III.1. Fiscal 
policy shocks appear to have a negative 
effect on the average output gap in all 
countries except Italy. In other words, 
the output gap improves without fiscal 
shocks. Moreover, its standard 
deviation is reduced by non-systematic 
fiscal policy only for France and Spain. 
The effects on the levels of inflation and 
the interest rate are minor, with a slight 
generalized increase in the standard 
deviation of these variables. 
To evaluate whether there are 
differences between discretionary 
policy and automatic stabilizers, we 
have repeated the same exercise using, 
respectively, government consumption 
and social benefits instead of total 
expenditures. The results are reported in 
the remaining rows of Table III.1. The 
major interesting finding is that social 
benefits slightly improve the output gap 
in Germany, but at the cost of a higher 
inflation and interest rates. Moreover, 
except in Germany, the output gap 
volatility increases more without 
government consumption than without 
social benefits.  
In summary, this analysis suggests that 
non-systematic fiscal policy played in 
general only a minor role in stabilizing 
the four largest economies of the Euro 
area over the period 1981-2001, with a 
limited impact also on inflation and the 
interest rate. 
The effects of macroeconomic 
variables 
A higher unexpected output gap is 
associated in all countries with higher 
inflation, and in turn with higher 
interest rates, in agreement with a 
Taylor rule type of explanation of 
monetary policy. Expenditures decrease 
in all countries, and then increase. 
Receipts follow a similar pattern. 
As far as an inflation shock is 
concerned, it leads to an increase in 
interest rates in all countries, except 
Spain where the effect is slightly 
negative and it is also associated with a 
non significant decrease in the output 
gap. In Germany the output gap reacts 
instead positively, while it is virtually 
unaffected in Italy and France. In all 
countries the impact effect on the fiscal 
variables is very limited, with the 
exception of Germany and Spain where 
there is a delayed reduction in receipts. 
In summary, the response of fiscal and 
monetary variables to unexpected 
changes in the output gap and inflation 
is rather similar across the four 
countries, though with some differences 
in the magnitude of the effects. 
Cross-country spillovers 
To evaluate whether non-systematic 
fiscal policy generates significant 
spillovers across countries, we 
estimated VARs that include the output 
gap, expenditures and receipts (all as 
ratios to GDP) for Germany and the 
same variables for, in turn, France, 
Italy, and Spain. Thus, we focus on 
spillovers from and to Germany. The 
main assumptions we make in 
constructing the VAR are that there is 
no contemporaneous feedback of 
foreign variables on Germany, and that 
the output gap is not 
contemporaneously affected by 
domestic fiscal policy.  
Here we comment on the main findings, 
focusing on the reaction of foreign 
countries to German shocks, since 
German variables react very little to 
foreign shocks. 
A positive output shock in Germany has 
a positive and significant effect in all 
countries, marginally so for Spain. 
Fiscal variables in turn react, and the 
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general pattern is a slight reduction in 
expenditures, accompanied by a similar 
reduction in receipts, a result similar to 
what we obtained before in the case of a 
home output shock. 
German fiscal shocks, by contrast, 
appear to have a limited direct effect on 
the other 3 euro countries, the responses 
are rather small and not significant, 
possibly with the exception of an 
increase in German expenditures on 
France (French expenditures and 
receipts react positively and 
significantly). 
The results we obtained so far should be 
interpreted with care because the 
analysis in the previous sections 
suggests that there could be an omitted 
variable bias. To address this issue, and 
provide more information on the 
usefulness of non-systematic fiscal 
policy coordination, we adopt an 
alternative approach. We simulate the 8-
variable VARs, substituting each 
country fiscal shocks with the German 
ones, in order to mimic the effects of an 
extreme form of policy coordination, 
with Germany implicitly in control of 
fiscal policy for the whole of the Euro 
area.  
The results are summarized in Table 
III.2. Substituting home for German 
fiscal shocks improves the average 
output gap for Spain only, at the cost of 
a slightly higher volatility and of a mild 
increase in inflation and the interest 
rate. The decrease of the output gap is 
rather marked in Italy, and is 
accompanied by higher inflation and 
interest rates, while the effects in France 
are minor for all the three variables. 
In the last part of Table III.2 we also 
report the correlation between the 
German and the other countries 
structural fiscal shocks. The figures are 
all rather small, the largest value is 0.29 
for the German-Spanish expenditure 
shocks, and even negative values are 
obtained in a few cases. Similar figures 
are obtained with the VARs residuals. 
Hence, the coordination in non-
systematic fiscal policy appears to be 
very low, and the results we obtained in 
this section on the size of the fiscal 
spillovers and the low efficacy of 
following German policy cast further 
doubts on the usefulness of a closer 
coordination. 
Disaggregating taxes and government 
expenditure 
We now disaggregate government 
receipts into revenues from taxes on 
business and on households, from 
indirect taxes, and from social 
contributions. Similarly, we consider 
separately three components of 
disbursements: government 
consumption, investment, and social 
benefits. Government consumption and 
investment are usually considered as 
discretionary, while social benefits 
depend on the level of unemployment 
and therefore the state of the economy, 
we think of social benefits as part of the 
automatic stabilizers. We can evaluate, 
therefore, whether there are major 
differences in the effects of these two 
types of non-systematic policy.  
We find that increases in taxes on 
business or households do not appear to 
have a significant negative effect on 
output, except in Germany, or a positive 
effect on prices. Indirect taxes and 
social contributions lead instead to a 
generalized mild increase in inflation, 
but the output gap decreases in 
Germany only, and only in the case of 
social contributions. 
The results on expenditures are also 
rather varied. Government consumption 
has a small or even negative effect on 
output in all countries except Italy. 
Government investment instead has a 
positive but delayed effect on the gap, 
except in Germany where the impact is 
also positive. The results for social 
benefits are more mixed, but in general 
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positive, possibly with some delay. The 
consequences for inflation are usually 
positive but minor and not statistically 
significant.  
To conclude, it may be worth recalling 
once more that here we are measuring 
the effects of the non-systematic 
components of fiscal policy, so that the 
level of each of the taxes or 
expenditures we have considered could 
generate additional effects on the output 
gap or inflation. It is also remarkable 
and relevant for policy making that 
there are several differences across 
countries in the effects of fiscal policy. 
One possible explanation is that we are 
using different identification schemes 
(though this is due to rejection of the 
same transmission mechanism by the 
data). Yet, the differences are still 
present in the case of Germany and 
France, for which exactly the same 
identification scheme is applied. 
Conclusions 
This chapter provides a set of stylized 
facts on the effects of non-systematic 
fiscal policy in the four largest countries 
of the Euro area, and discusses their 
policy implications. 
A remarkable and policy relevant 
finding is that there emerge several 
differences across countries in the 
effects of fiscal shocks, which cannot be 
attributed to the econometric 
methodology (and also cast serious 
doubts on analyses based on panel 
data). This makes non-systematic fiscal 
policy coordination difficult to be 
implemented, and the absence of direct 
spillovers across countries further limits 
its scope. A thorough examination of 
the source of these cross-country 
differences is beyond the scope of this 
chapter, since it requires a careful 
institutional analysis, but can be an 
interesting topic for future research. 
The overall picture that emerges is that 
expenditure policies are rather 
ineffective in reducing the output gap, 
possibly with the exception of 
government investment, and can require 
deficit financing. Tax shocks appear to 
be rather ineffective too in reducing 
business cycle fluctuations, but could be 
used to reduce the government deficit 
when needed. 
Moreover, non-systematic fiscal policy 
appears to have an impact on interest 
rates, either direct or trough the output 
gap and inflation, and the exclusion of 
fiscal variables can bias in a few cases 
the evaluation of the effects of monetary 
shocks. Instead, in general, the effects 
of monetary policy on disbursements 
and receipts appear to be minor. 
A final caveat is that this analysis 
covers a period when the fiscal 
conditions of the countries changed 
considerably, in particular in the ‘90s 
after the signing of the Maastricht treaty 
and of the Stability and Growth pact. 
The question then is whether the 
enhanced fiscal discipline, combined 
with a single currency, can be expected 
to change substantially the results we 
obtained. For example, the requirement 
of a close to balanced budget can force 
the governments to improve the efficacy 
of government expenditure by carefully 
selecting its composition or changing 
the decision and implementation 
process. Or the pressing comments of 
the European Central Bank on those 
high debt countries that could create 
problems for the stability of the euro 
could convince them to create stronger 
links between taxes and expenditures. 
But the recent experience has shown 
that it takes time for the governments to 
accept the stricter rules imposed by the 
monetary union, so that the results we 
derived could provide a good guide also 
for the near future. 
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Table III.1: Mean and standard deviation of actual and simulated series. 
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
Output Gap (actual) -0.2407 2.8167 0.1098 1.1888 0.1022 1.3027 -0.2949 1.5629
(base) -0.2135 2.5650 0.1742 1.5489 0.0287 1.3565 -0.2733 1.7978
(gov con) -0.2299 2.4098 -0.1272 1.9217 0.0411 1.3409 -0.2171 1.9732
(soc ben) -0.2557 2.8326 0.1249 1.3692 0.0705 1.2358 -0.1169 1.4954
Inflation (actual) 1.2347 0.9635 1.8446 1.6798 3.0470 2.1083 3.0478 1.7899
(base) 1.2339 0.9263 1.9351 1.7003 3.1218 2.0122 3.0112 1.6363
(gov con) 1.2370 0.8992 1.6347 1.7913 3.0903 2.0497 2.8066 1.9869
(soc ben) 1.1148 0.9989 1.8945 1.6858 3.0673 2.0938 3.3296 1.6391
Interest r. (actual) 5.9257 2.4962 8.1512 3.6383 11.3304 4.9669 11.1043 4.8841
(base) 5.9361 2.2330 8.9889 3.1972 11.1974 4.8695 11.0456 5.3162
(gov con) 5.9571 2.2944 5.8596 5.8816 11.3385 4.7993 11.3204 5.6622
(soc ben) 5.5048 2.6038 8.8894 4.0230 11.3690 4.8356 11.2975 4.0296
Germany France Italy Spain
 
(actual) = actual series; (base) = series simulated by setting to zero the fiscal shocks in the base case 
scenario; (gov con) = series simulated by setting to zero the government consumption/GDP shock and the 
shock to total revenue/GDP in VAR with government consumption/GDP instead of total 
expenditures/GDP; (soc. ben) = series simulated by setting to zero the shock to social benefits/GDP and 
the shock to total revenue/GDP in VAR with social benefits/GDP instead of total expenditures/GDP. 
 
Table III.2: Mean and standard deviation of actual and simulated series with German 
shocks. 
mean sd mean sd mean sd
Output Gap (actual) 0.1098 1.1888 0.1022 1.3027 -0.2949 1.5629
(simulated) 0.0858 1.5831 0.0528 1.2018 -0.1464 1.6371
Inflation (actual) 1.8446 1.6798 3.0470 2.1083 3.0478 1.7899
(simulated) 1.8252 1.7880 3.1690 1.9932 3.2134 1.6902
Interest r. (actual) 8.1512 3.6383 11.3304 4.9669 11.1043 4.8841
(simulated) 8.1587 4.4920 11.3590 4.7164 11.2967 4.3993
(corr_s G)
(corr_s T)
Spain
-0.1166
France Italy
0.1486 0.0339
-0.1517-0.2582
0.2918
 
(actual) = actual series; (simulated) = series simulated using Germany fiscal shocks instead of country 
specific shocks; (corr_s G) and (corr_s T) = correlation among each country structural fiscal shocks (G 
total government expenditure, T total government revenues) and Germany structural fiscal shocks; 
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Part IV The evolution of labour costs in the context of 
a currency union. 
I t is widely understood that inside a currency union, the exchange rate can only be used to improve 
competitiveness against third countries 
but not against other countries 
participating in the union. For this 
reason, to keep an intraregional 
equilibrium in terms of economic 
activity and employment, the 
relationship between wages and 
productivity is central. However, it is 
expected that market competition and 
the introduction of the euro will reduce 
wage differentials between European 
countries, and this fact could imply a 
convergence process of unit labour 
costs. There are three factors that could 
contribute to a reduction in wage 
differentials: migration, the Balassa-
Samuelson effect and the role of trade 
unions. 
Firstly, if workers from low wage 
economies move to economies with 
high wages, the process towards wage 
equalisation could be enhanced. 
Secondly, there is the Balassa-
Samuelson effect. This suggests that 
countries with fast growing labour 
productivity in the tradable sector face 
higher inflation in their non-tradable 
sector than their trade partners. As a 
result, even if they have a fully fixed 
exchange rate, a currency board or 
indeed a common currency with their 
trade partners, they will experience 
higher overall inflation and 
consequently higher wages. If in low-
wage countries, the non-tradable sector 
is more relevant than in high-wage 
countries, there could be a process 
towards wage equalisation. However, 
since the effect is more a rise in the 
relative price of non-tradable goods, 
rather than a general increase in the 
price level, the inflation differential due 
to the B-S effect would have no 
implications for the competitiveness of 
the country's tradable goods sector. 
Finally, the transparency of a common 
currency could reduce wage 
differentials across countries due to a 
“demonstration” or “fair wage” effect. 
Being able to compare wages in the 
same currency between European 
countries could increase convergence 
between wages. 
While productivity rates are lower in 
poorer economies, wages may be 
influenced by factors at the national 
level, such as wage bargaining between 
unions and employers. The experience 
of the United States shows that in a first 
stage, unions tried to reduce 
geographical wage differentials and 
only the pressure of external 
competitors has changed this trend 
towards a higher wage differentiation. 
In the case of the German reunification, 
the trend has been similar. However, the 
European case could be different: 
historical, cultural and institutional 
differences and the pressure of external 
competitors could act in an opposite 
direction. Moreover, the coordination 
could be complex, as the Doorn 
initiative (bargaining cooperation of the 
trade union federations of Belgium, 
Germany, Netherlands and 
Luxembourg) shows. It is also worth 
mentioning in this context the wage 
moderation effect of the price stability 
target of the ECB.  
This chapter analyses the evolution of 
wages, productivity and labour costs 
among Euro area countries and is 
organised as follows. The next section 
considers the relationship between 
wages and productivity in the different 
European countries and the role of the 
different labour markets institutions as a 
mechanism to limit wage increases to 
productivity gains. Then, we presents 
empirical evidence about convergence 
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of wages, productivity and unit labour 
costs in Euro area countries. The 
chapter ends with some policy 
guidelines. 
Unit labour costs and labour market 
institutions 
Unit labour costs in the last 20 years, 
among the member states of the 
European Union can be separated into 
three different components: the 
evolution of nominal wages, the 
evolution of productivity in real terms 
and the evolution of the exchange rate. 
Looking at data for Euro area countries 
from 1981 to 2001, the two most 
important components in the evolution 
of unit labour cost are wages and the 
exchange rate while productivity has a 
very limited role in the evolution of a 
country's competitiveness. Focusing on 
the relative contribution of intra-EU 
exchange rates (the ones that have 
disappeared as a result of the 
introduction of the Euro) and extra-EU 
exchange rate (the one that can be used 
as a response to adverse symmetric 
common shocks), it turns out that while 
in Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain, the exchange 
rate against the mark has been used as a 
way to react when wages evolution goes 
out of line with productivity, in other 
countries such as Austria and the 
Netherlands this is not the case.  
The process of economic convergence 
to a single currency requires 
convergence in inflation rates. By the 
time the single currency has been 
adopted, this has been largely achieved. 
As intra-EU exchange rates can no 
longer be used in the future to restore 
lost competitiveness, the future 
evolution of wages should be in line 
with the evolution of productivity, for a 
given inflation rate in the Euro area. 
But, in Euro area countries, during the 
last decades, have wages evolved in line 
with productivity? To obtain a 
quantitative measure of the intensity of 
the relationship between wages and 
productivity, we have estimated 
aggregate wage curves for the European 
countries, plus six other OECD 
countries (Australia, Canada, Japan, 
Norway, Switzerland and the United 
States) from 1960 to 2001. In the 
twenty countries we examined, a 
positive and significant relationship 
between wages and productivity has 
been found. However, the results have 
shown that there are important 
differences in the response of wages to 
productivity among these countries. The 
countries where the response of wages 
to changes in productivity is highest are 
Canada, Netherlands, Spain, United 
States, Switzerland, Italy, France and 
Japan. 
But, what explains these differences in 
the response of wages to productivity? 
In other words, which factors can 
determine that wages evolution is in 
line with productivity? In order to 
answer this question, we have estimated 
different multiple regression models 
using as an endogenous variable the 
estimates of the response of wages to 
productivity changes, with explanatory 
variables related with different 
economic factors and labour market 
institutions. The results of these models 
have shown that the degree of 
centralisation, trade union density and 
the technological level are relevant 
variables to explain cross-country 
differences in the response of wages to 
productivity. Policy measures in the 
proper direction could help to reduce 
these differences across the Euro area 
countries. 
 
Convergence of wages, productivity 
and labour costs in Euro area 
countries 
In this section, convergence of wages, 
productivity and unit labour costs is 
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analysed using different approaches: 
cross-section tests of the average 
growth across a sample of countries (β 
convergence); measures of the 
dispersion of these variables across 
countries over time (σ-convergence); 
and, finally, time series tests of the 
stationarity of differences in the levels 
over time (mainly, unit root and 
cointegration tests). The assumptions 
behind these approaches are different. 
With cross-section tests economies are 
assumed to be in transition towards a 
unique steady state (absolute 
convergence), and initial differences 
should tend to shrink over time. 
Different steady states can also be 
considered (conditional convergence) 
introducing other explanatory variables 
or using panel data with fixed effects. 
However, with time series tests, 
economies are assumed to be near 
steady-state equilibrium.  
Table IV.1 shows results for β 
convergence for Euro area countries in 
the period 1981-2001. From this table, 
we can conclude that there is β 
convergence in terms of unit labour 
costs and compensation per employee, 
being higher for the former. However, 
for labour productivity, the speed of 
convergence is not significant. The 
values of the speed of convergence for 
unit labour costs and compensation per 
employee imply that, in the first case, 
thirty-eight years would be required to 
reduce to half the initial differences 
among countries, while for the second 
more than fifty years would be required. 
 
Table IV.1: β-convergence: cross-section results. 
β-convergence EU-11 (1981-2001)   Cross-section Panel data (pool) Panel data 
(Country fixed effects) 
Unit labour costs β 1.82 %* 5.82 %* 10.84 %* 
 R2 0.668   
Compensation per employee β 1.34 %* 4 %* 8.30 %* 
 R2 0.607   
Labour productivity β 1.63% 0.73% 1.74% 
  R2 0.17     
Source: Own estimates from OECD data. EU-11: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal 
and Spain. * significant at the 5% level 
 
The results confirm that convergence 
has taken place in growth rates of 
nominal wages, as price inflation 
converged, but there is little evidence 
from this analysis that productivity 
levels are converging. Since unit labour 
costs are the difference between wages 
and productivity, convergence here is 
largely a reflection of a convergence in 
the growth rates of nominal wages. 
From the point of view of the 
competitiveness of parts of the Euro 
area, once there is a common currency, 
nominal and real wages across the area 
must differ depending on productivity. 
Regions that have low productivity on 
average will pay lower wages. 
Another way to examine convergence is 
to look at the degree of variation, or 
dispersion of wages and productivity 
over time, with the σ-convergence 
method. Figure IV.1 provides a visual 
picture of the process of convergence 
over time. Again the reduction in the 
dispersion of wages and unit labour 
costs reflects the convergence of 
inflation rates. There is some suggestion 
that productivity has converged slightly 
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during the second half of the 1990s, but 
over the last twenty years, there have 
been persistent differences in 
productivity and therefore in the 
standard of living of different parts of 
the Euro area. 
 
Figure IV.1: σ-convergence of Unit labour costs, Compensations and Productivity. 
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Source: Own calculations from OECD data.  The values of σ-convergence have been normalised to unity in the initial period.  
 
Policy guidelines 
Differences in real and nominal wages 
across the Euro area reflect differences 
in average productivity. Convergence in 
real wages ought therefore to take place 
via relative increases in productivity (as 
in Ireland). However, if after the 
introduction of the euro wage 
differentials shrink due to a 
“demonstration” or “fair wage” effect, 
competitiveness would be damaged and 
since the exchange rate can not be used, 
employment would suffer. For this 
reason, increases in wages should be 
accompanied by productivity 
improvements as the only way to 
maintain competitiveness. 
The evidence in the second section of 
this chapter suggests that there are some 
policy options that should be taken into 
account to improve the current 
situation: the collective wage 
bargaining systems should be more 
decentralised, the level of collective 
bargaining should be closer to the firm, 
and it should be possible to apply opt-
outs at the regional or at the firm level. 
Workers, unions and firms should take 
into account regional, sectorial and firm 
conditions when negotiating wages. 
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Part V The US current account deficit 
I n 2001 the US current account deficit reached 4.1% of GDP. The worry is that if the deficit does not 
move back closer to balance or keeps 
widening, U.S. external liabilities 
would represent a growing share of 
world portfolios.  At some point 
investors could become unwilling to 
hold dollars. The ensuing large 
adjustment in the current account and 
fall in the external value of the dollar 
could lead to substantial dislocations in 
the world economy and disruptions in 
U.S. and world financial markets.  
The deficit rose very quickly from 
1.5% of GDP in 1995, which was the 
average of the previous two decades, to 
4.5% in 2000. The rapid growth of the 
U.S. economy relative to Europe and 
Japan, coupled with a steady 
strengthening of the dollar driven 
largely by capital flows is the main 
factor contributing to the emergence of 
the deficit. The domestic counterpart 
was the investment boom occurred 
between 1996 and 2000 and the 
contemporaneous drop in private 
agents’ saving rate. The mild 
slowdown in economic activity in 2001 
reduced the gap slightly.  
The central issue is what is a 
sustainable current account deficit for 
an economy such as the US whose 
currency is very widely used for 
trading purposes.  
Two approaches to sustainability 
We examine two approaches to 
determine what the sustainable current 
account deficit is. In the first, an 
intertemporal approach to the balance 
of payments emphasises both the 
importance of domestic saving and 
investment decisions and the role of 
international portfolio decisions by 
both domestic residents and foreigners. 
The question is what deficit is 
consistent with a number of reasonable 
assumptions about US growth, changes 
in the real exchange rate, import 
penetration and desired portfolio 
holdings. Calculations suggest that a 
deficit of 3.5% of GDP is sustainable.  
 
Figure V.1: The US current account deficit and the growth rate 
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Figure V.2: The US current account deficit and the real effective exchange rate 
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Figure V.3: The US current account deficit and the US public deficit- surplus 
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The second approach is more 
quantitative, and uses a structural VAR 
in order to decompose the deficit into 
its cyclical and structural components. 
Visual inspection of Figures 1 to 4 
reveals a very distinct cyclical 
component to the deficit. The current 
account shows small surpluses during 
the recessions of the early 1980s and 
1990s and large deficits during the 
peaks of the mid-1980s and late 1990s. 
By contrast, the structural deficit is that 
path for the deficit consistent with 
average (1980 – 2001) real exchange 
rate and US growth relative to the rest 
of the world. On this interpretation, the 
difference between the actual deficit 
and the structural deficit can be 
attributed to the faster rate of growth of 
the US economy relative to the rest of 
the world.  
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Figure V.4: Observed and “Structural” current account deficit 
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A real business cycle interpretation of 
this finding is that the technological 
shock coming from electronics and IT 
has been taken up much more quickly 
during the 1990s by the US compared 
to elsewhere. Since domestic savings 
are unlikely to rise in response (and 
may well fall) the investment boom 
domestically has to imply a current 
account deficit. The question is what 
the medium term outlook will be. In 
the standard growth model a 
technological shock will only affect 
growth over the medium term as the 
capital stock rises. However, once the 
technology has been fully taken up 
elsewhere the (comparatively) high 
growth rate in the US will recede and 
the current account will move back 
towards a lower equilibrium. 
Simulations with MARMOTTE 
While the kind of analysis in the 
previous section is re-assuring, it 
abstracts from the adjustment process 
once the technological advantage is 
eroded. We have carried out two 
simulations on a modified version of 
the MARMOTTE multicountry model 
which includes just the US, Japan and 
the Euro area as a whole. The basic 
question we tried to address is the 
following: is it possible to replicate the 
most important features of the U.S. 
business cycle of the recent years 
(namely, the investment boom, the 
deepening of the current account and 
the massive real appreciation of the US 
dollar) by means of simple shocks? 
The aim of the exercise is twofold. On 
the one hand we seek to interpret the 
past by identifying the most important 
shocks. On the other, we try to give 
some hints about the future 
developments of the current account 
and the real exchange rate. In 
particular we want to assess the 
likelihood of a reversal in the current 
account deficit.  
Starting from the second half of the 
1990s two kinds of shocks hit the US 
economy: a positive permanent 
productivity shock and a reduction in 
the risk premium on US assets.  
The introduction of IT technology led 
to a permanent increase in total factor 
productivity, whose magnitude was 
partly unexpected by agents. Insofar as 
agents had to revise upward their 
expectations of productivity over the 
first few years, this surprise is 
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modelled by a sequence of unexpected 
additive shocks to total factor 
productivity. Furthermore, to account 
for expectations of sustained higher 
growth and profitability in the US 
economy compared to the Euro area 
and Japan, the second shock has been 
calibrated as a significant reduction of 
the US risk premium. It was modelled 
as a temporary sequential reduction of 
the US risk premium over a period of 
three years, followed by a reversal at 
the end of the fourth year, which 
brought it back to the level prevailing 
at the end of the first year.  
The combination of these two shocks 
reproduces quite well the dynamics of 
the US macroeconomic performance. 
The positive productivity shock leads 
to a huge increase in investment until 
the end of 2000 as production factors 
became relatively less expensive. 
Insofar as households expected a 
permanent increase in their level of 
income and wealth, they started to 
consume more. The rise in domestic 
demand, reflected in sustained GDP 
growth, boosted US imports and so the 
US current account deteriorates. This 
volume effect is further amplified by a 
price effect, arising from the real 
appreciation of the dollar, which 
follows the nominal rate. The 
depreciation of the euro and the Yen is 
the direct result of the reduction of the 
risk premium on the US assets. This 
entails huge inflows of capital to the 
US. Indeed, any US portfolio 
investment becomes more attractive by 
its relatively higher return. 
In 2001, the productivity growth is 
halted. Firms, having accumulated too 
much capital, revise downwards their 
investment plans. This moderates 
permanently GDP growth and thereby 
imports, which stop the deterioration 
of the trade balance afterwards. 
From 2002 onwards, such a scenario 
foresees investment growing slowly 
due to past over-accumulation. The 
reversion of expectations about the risk 
of the US economy entails a sizeable 
nominal depreciation of the dollar. 
Even if the dollar depreciates in real 
terms, it remains appreciated with 
respect to its baseline value. The 
overall effect on the trade balance is a 
continuous, but slow reduction of the 
deficit.  
Effects on the Euro area 
The spillovers on Euro area GDP are 
significant during the first years of the 
shock (roughly until 2002), due to the 
increased demand stemming from the 
United States and from the pro 
competitive effects of the Euro’s real 
depreciation. This also contributes to 
the improvement of the trade balance. 
These effects dampen over time.  
When the effects of the productivity 
shocks are over and the nominal 
appreciation of the US dollar due to the 
inflows of capital ends, the euro 
experiences a marked real 
appreciation, with a negative impact on 
the trade balance and growth.  
The effects on different parts of the 
Euro area are also asymmetric because 
of the different composition of exports 
and imports and greater exposure to 
trade outside of the Euro area. Because 
Irish imports from outside the Euro 
area are almost 32 % of GDP, 
compared to 9.6% for France, Ireland 
is most hit by the depreciation, losing 
4.6% of GDP in total. Portugal, which 
exports only the equivalent of 7% of 
GDP to countries outside the Euro area 
is least affected, losing only 0.9% of 
GDP. 
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